Four specific, implementable changes derived directly from the documented transaction failures on this site. Each addresses a structural gap — not individual conduct. Each is adoptable by any Georgia city or DDA today, without state legislation.
These reforms are structural, not punitive. The officials involved in the transactions documented on this site are volunteer neighbors acting in good faith within a system that does not require them to have the professional infrastructure that comparable private transactions would automatically deploy. These reforms supply that infrastructure procedurally — so the outcome doesn't depend on whether any individual board member happens to have commercial real estate expertise.
Derived from: The DJJ Building Sale
Any Purchase and Sale Agreement for a DDA-owned asset above $1M must include a provision requiring re-appraisal if a material event occurs before or concurrent with closing. Material events include: execution of a lease with a term exceeding five years, a zoning change that increases development potential, or a bond commitment that will service the property.
If the re-appraised value exceeds the contract price by 10% or more, the seller has the right to terminate the agreement or renegotiate the price. The buyer's transaction costs for the renegotiation period are recoverable from the price adjustment.
Why this addresses the DJJ failure: The DJJ building was sold at a price negotiated before the state lease was finalized. The 20-year lease commenced on the same day as the closing. A Material Value Adjustment Clause would have required re-appraisal once the lease was locked — and the re-appraised value of a fully-leased government building with a 20-year term would have been dramatically higher than $7.45M.
Derived from: The DJJ Building Sale
Any DDA transaction above $5M involving a sale, bond issuance, or long-term lease commitment must retain an Independent Financial Advisor (IFA) with a documented fiduciary obligation to the public entity — meaning a legal duty to act in the public's financial interest, not the deal's — separate from bond counsel, transaction counsel, or any advisor whose fee depends on the transaction closing.
The IFA must produce a written opinion addressing: (a) whether the proposed price or terms represent fair value to the public, (b) what alternatives to the proposed structure were considered, and (c) what the estimated value of any ancillary benefits to the buyer — including tax abatements — represents in present-value terms. This opinion must be included in the public record before the vote.
Why this addresses the DJJ failure: Bond counsel in the DJJ transaction was engaged to facilitate the bond issuance; its fee depended on the deal closing. No party in the transaction had a fiduciary obligation to ask whether the DDA was receiving fair value, or whether retaining the building and issuing the bond itself would have been more beneficial to the public. An IFA would have been required to address both questions explicitly.
Derived from: The DJJ Building Sale
A conduit bond is a bond issued by a public authority on behalf of a private buyer — the public entity lends its tax-exempt borrowing status to reduce the buyer's financing cost, while the buyer repays the bond from the project's income. Before approving conduit financing for a private buyer of a DDA-owned asset, the board must formally consider and document a response to the following question: "If the tenant's lease payments are sufficient to service this bond, what is the public benefit of selling the asset rather than issuing the bond and retaining ownership?"
The answer may legitimately favor a sale — management burden, capital deployment, risk transfer, or other factors may justify it. But the question must be on the record, with a documented answer, before the vote.
Why this matters: The conduit bond in the DJJ transaction provided the buyer with financing at a fixed rate. The building's lease income from the state tenant — $2.15M annually — was more than sufficient to service the bond. If the DDA had retained the building and issued the bond itself, it would have captured that income stream for 20 years rather than selling the asset. The DDA board minutes do not reflect that this comparison was ever formally considered.
Derived from: The Willis Abatement Transfer
All Bond for Title, lease-leaseback, and similar abatement arrangements granted by a DDA must include a mandatory clawback provision: if the property is sold within the abatement term, the present value of the remaining abatement stream — calculated at the time of sale using the applicable millage rates and most recent assessed value — is paid proportionally to each affected taxing authority before or at closing.
The developer retains the full inducement value for which the abatement was granted: the economic viability of the development during construction and lease-up. Windfall value derived from a quick sale at a stabilized cap rate — after the development has been completed and the risk absorbed — is a separate economic event. The public subsidy that helped create that value should not transfer automatically to a private buyer as a free asset.
Why this addresses the Willis failure: South City Partners and ELV Associates received a tax abatement to make development on a vacant site financially viable. The abatement served its stated purpose. When they sold the stabilized building for $52.5M — with nine years of abatement remaining — the remaining abatement value was capitalized into the sale price and transferred to the buyer. The school district, which bore ~49.5% of the abatement cost and had no vote on its creation, received nothing at the sale.
None of these reforms requires state legislation. Each can be adopted as a DDA board policy, included in standard transaction documents, or incorporated into a city's DDA operating guidelines. They do not restrict DDAs from executing transactions; they require that certain questions be asked and documented before those transactions are approved.
The structural problem these reforms address — volunteer boards executing complex financial transactions without professional infrastructure — is not unique to Avondale Estates. It exists wherever small city DDAs have the authority to sell assets, issue bonds, and grant tax abatements without procedural requirements commensurate with the financial stakes involved.
If you represent a city, DDA, or policy organization that would like to discuss these reforms, the contact information for this site is below.
A printable one-page summary of all four reforms, suitable for presenting to a DDA board or city council. (Coming soon — document in preparation.)